Now JWT_LOADER takes the alg as argument, to avoid security issue where the lib is taking alg from the header (which may be a bad security weakness).

This commit is contained in:
Jocelyn Fiat
2017-07-11 23:32:11 +02:00
parent 27ee20f99b
commit 2748e1d9ee
4 changed files with 105 additions and 22 deletions

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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
note
description: "Summary description for {JWT_MISMATCHED_ALG_ERROR}."
date: "$Date$"
revision: "$Revision$"
class
JWT_MISMATCHED_ALG_ERROR
inherit
JWT_ERROR
create
make
feature {NONE} -- Initialization
make (a_alg, a_header_alg: READABLE_STRING_8)
do
alg := a_alg
header_alg := a_header_alg
end
feature -- Access
alg: READABLE_STRING_8
header_alg: READABLE_STRING_8
id: STRING = "ALG_MISMATCH"
message: READABLE_STRING_8
do
Result := "Header alg [" + header_alg + "] does not match given alg [" + alg + "]!"
end
end

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@@ -118,6 +118,11 @@ feature {JWT_UTILITIES} -- Error reporting
l_errors.extend (err)
end
report_mismatched_alg_error (alg, a_header_alg: READABLE_STRING_8)
do
report_error (create {JWT_MISMATCHED_ALG_ERROR}.make (alg, a_header_alg))
end
report_unsupported_alg_error (alg: READABLE_STRING_8)
do
report_error (create {JWT_UNSUPPORTED_ALG_ERROR}.make (alg))

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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
note
description: "Summary description for {JWT_LOADER}."
author: ""
description: "Loader and verifier to JWT token."
date: "$Date$"
revision: "$Revision$"
EIS: "name=Known Critical vulnerabilities in JWT libs", "protocol=URI", "src=https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-json-web-token-libraries/"
class
JWT_LOADER
@@ -12,9 +12,13 @@ inherit
feature -- Access
token (a_token_input: READABLE_STRING_8; a_secret: READABLE_STRING_8; ctx: detachable JWT_CONTEXT): detachable JWT
-- Decoded token from `a_token_input` given the secret `a_secret`, and optional context `ctx`
token (a_token_input: READABLE_STRING_8; a_alg: detachable READABLE_STRING_8; a_verification_key: READABLE_STRING_8; ctx: detachable JWT_CONTEXT): detachable JWT
-- Decoded token from `a_token_input` given the verification key `a_verification_key` and optional (but recommended) signature algorithm `a_alg`, and optional context `ctx`
-- used to specify eventual issuer and various parameters.
-- WARNING: passing Void for `a_alg` is not safe, as the server should know which alg he used for tokens,
-- leaving the possibility to use the header alg is dangerous as client may use "none" and then bypass verification!
require
a_valid_alg: a_alg /= Void implies is_supporting_signature_algorithm (a_alg)
local
jws: JWS
i,j,n: INTEGER
@@ -29,20 +33,27 @@ feature -- Access
l_enc_payload := a_token_input.substring (i + 1, j - 1)
l_signature := a_token_input.substring (j + 1, n)
create jws.make_with_json_payload (base64url_decode (l_enc_payload))
alg := signature_algorithm_from_encoded_header (l_enc_header)
jws.set_algorithm (alg)
if alg = Void then
-- Use default
alg := alg_hs256
if a_alg /= Void then
if alg /= Void and then not alg.is_case_insensitive_equal_general (a_alg) then
jws.report_mismatched_alg_error (a_alg, alg)
else
alg := a_alg
end
else
if alg = Void then
-- Use default
alg := alg_hs256
end
end
jws.set_algorithm (alg)
check alg_set: alg /= Void end
if ctx = Void or else not ctx.validation_ignored then
if not is_supporting_signature_algorithm (alg) then
jws.report_unsupported_alg_error (alg)
alg := alg_hs256
end
if not l_signature.same_string (signature (l_enc_header, l_enc_payload, a_secret, alg)) then
if not l_signature.same_string (signature (l_enc_header, l_enc_payload, a_verification_key, alg)) then
jws.report_unverified_token_error
end
if

View File

@@ -54,7 +54,14 @@ feature -- Test
create jwt_loader
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
-- Use header alg!
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, Void, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
assert ("same payload", l_tok.claimset.string.same_string (payload))
end
-- Use given alg!
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
assert ("same payload", l_tok.claimset.string.same_string (payload))
end
@@ -96,21 +103,21 @@ feature -- Test
create jwt_loader
-- Test with validation + exp
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
assert ("same payload", l_tok.claimset.string.same_string (payload))
end
create ctx
ctx.set_time (now)
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
end
dt := duplicated_time (now)
dt.hour_add (5)
ctx.set_time (dt)
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("exp error", l_tok.has_error)
end
@@ -122,7 +129,7 @@ feature -- Test
tok := jwt.encoded_string ("secret")
ctx.set_time (now)
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("has nbf error", l_tok.has_error)
end
@@ -130,7 +137,7 @@ feature -- Test
dt.second_add (15)
ctx.set_time (dt)
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("has nbf error", l_tok.has_error)
end
@@ -138,31 +145,51 @@ feature -- Test
dt.minute_add (45)
ctx.set_time (dt)
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
end
-- Test Issuer
ctx.set_issuer ("urn:foobar")
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("has iss error", l_tok.has_error)
end
ctx.set_issuer ("urn:foo")
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
end
-- Test Audience
ctx.set_audience ("urn:foobar")
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("has aud error", l_tok.has_error)
end
ctx.set_audience ("urn:foo")
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
if attached jwt_loader.token (tok, jwt.algorithm, "secret", ctx) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not l_tok.has_error)
end
end
test_mismatched_alg_jwt
local
jwt: JWS
payload: STRING
tok: STRING
do
payload := "[
{"iss":"joe","exp":1300819380,"http://example.com/is_root":true}
]"
create jwt.make_with_json_payload (payload)
jwt.set_algorithm ("none")
tok := jwt.encoded_string ("secret")
if attached (create {JWT_LOADER}).token (tok, "HS256", "secret", Void) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not jwt.has_error)
assert ("same payload", l_tok.claimset.string.same_string (payload))
end
end
test_unsecured_jwt
local
jwt: JWS
@@ -177,7 +204,11 @@ feature -- Test
jwt.set_algorithm ("none")
tok := jwt.encoded_string ("secret")
if attached (create {JWT_LOADER}).token (tok, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
if attached (create {JWT_LOADER}).token (tok, "none", "secret", Void) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not jwt.has_error)
assert ("same payload", l_tok.claimset.string.same_string (payload))
end
if attached (create {JWT_LOADER}).token (tok, Void, "secret", Void) as l_tok then
assert ("no error", not jwt.has_error)
assert ("same payload", l_tok.claimset.string.same_string (payload))
end